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Elimination of Automatic
Judgment Liens in Missouri
By William H. Henning
The traditional automatic
judgment lien on real
property following rendition
of a money judgment has
been statutorily eliminated.
Judgment liens are now
dependent upon the filing of
an abstract of the judgment
IT HAS BECOME ALMOST AX-
IOMATIC to say that the money
judgment' of a Missouri court of record
is a lien on the judgment debtor's real
property located in the county in which
the court sits, but a recent enactment of
the Missouri legislature appears to have
abolished this automatic lien.2 The new
legislation is, however, ambiguous in
several respects, and the purpose of this
article is to examine the act in an
attempt to resolve these ambiguities. In
the process, the article will also deal
with some other aspects of judgment
liens not specifically within the scope of
the new legislation.
In order to understand the new act it
is necessary to place it in a historical
context. Prior to the court reorganiza-
tion that became effective January 2,
1979, Section 511.350, RSMo Supp.
1975, provided that judgments and de-
crees "rendered by the supreme court,
by any United States district or circuit
court held within this state, by any dis-
trict of the court of appeals, and by any
court of record, except judgments and
decrees rendered by magistrate courts
... "1 were liens on the judgment debt-
by the court clerk, but the
implementing legislation
contains ambiguities that
raise issues regarding the
scope of such liens.
or's real property "situate in the county
for which or in which the court is held." 3
Missouri courts of record were statutori-
ly defined as the supreme court, the
courts of appeals, the circuit courts, the
magistrate courts, the probate courts
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and the courts of common pleas.4 The
liens commenced on the day the judg-
ment was rendered 5 and arose automati-
cally in that no further action by the





There were exceptions to the automa-
tic lien provisions. For example, judg-
ments rendered by courts in a city hav-
ing over one hundred thousand inhabi-
tants or in a county having over sixty
thousand inhabitants did not become
liens until an abstract of the judgment
was entered in a book kept by the clerk
of the circuit court having jurisdiction
over civil actions in that city or county. 6
The clerks of the other courts of record
within such a city or county were under
an affirmative duty to furnish an abstract
ofjudgments rendered in their courts to
the circuit court clerk within five days
following rendition, and the circuit
court clerks were required to enter the
abstracts at once.' In addition, the cir-
cuit court clerks were required to pre-
pare and enter abstracts of judgments of
their own courts within five days follow-
ing rendition.' Finally, any party could
furnish an abstract to the circuit court
clerk, who was required to enter it
immediately. 9 This last technique could
be utilized by attorneys who did not
want to wait up to five days to have their
abstracts entered and as a vehicle to
create liens from federal district court
judgments in such cities or counties
since the affirmative duty to provide ab-
stracts did not extend to the clerks of
federal courts.
Another important exception to the
automatic judgment lien was a limita-
tion on the effect of magistrate court
judgments, which did not become liens
until a certified transcript of the judg-
ment was filed with the clerk of the cir-
cuit court of the county in which the
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judgment was rendered.1 ° However,
since probate courts were defined as
courts of record but were not subject to
transcripting requirements like those
imposed on the magistrate courts, their
money judgments were automatic liens
except in those populous cities and
counties where courts of record were
subjected to the abstracting require-
ments set out in the preceding para-
graph. These liens created problems for
title attorneys in rural areas, but the
problems were minimal since the pro-
bate courts rarely rendered money
judgments. "
Effective January 2, 1979, the court
system in Missouri was restructured by
revision of Article V of the Missouri
Constitution and implementing legisla-
tion. As a result, the old inferior courts
such as the magistrate courts, probate
courts, courts of common pleas and
municipal corporation courts were abol-
ished as independent tribunals 12 and
their jurisdictions were transferred to
the circuit courts, 13 which now have
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal
matters. 14 Most of the jurisdiction of the
old magistrate courts was transferred to
associate circuit court judges, and prac-
tice and procedure in most cases heard
in the new associate divisions is now
governed by the Court Reform and Re-
vision Act of 1978, the relevant provi-
sions of which are codified at Chapter
Most important aspect of
this procedure for
present purposes
517, RSMo 1978.15 The most important
aspect of this procedure for present pur-
poses is a transcripting requirement
similar to that applicable to the old
magistrate courts. Sections 517.770 and
517.780, RSMo 1978, which have not
been revised by the recent legislation,
provide that every judgment of the
associate division in a case within the
scope of Chapter 517 operates as a lien
on the real estate of the judgment debt-
or from the time a certified transcript of
the judgment is filed with the clerk of
the circuit court of the county in which
the judgment is rendered. The tran-
scripts are available upon demand
(there is no affirmative duty placed on
the clerks to prepare them as was the
case with abstracts of judgments ren-
dered by courts of record in populous
cities and counties), and the clerk of the
circuit court is required to file the trans-
cript, record it in a book to be kept for
that purpose, and enter it in his perma-
nent record of circuit court judg-
ments. 16 In other cases within the juris-
diction of the associate divisions buit out-
side the scope of Chapter 517,17 the
transcripting requirements are inappli-
cable and, prior to the new legislation,
apparently operated as automatic liens
except in areas where the courts were
subject to abstracting requirements. 18
The effect of the new act on such judg-
ments is explored below.
Effect of new act on
such judgments
The court reorganization failed to re-
solve some problems for title attorneys
and created others. Since Chapter 517
does not apply to practice and proce-
dure in the probate divisions,1 9 money
judgments rendered in such divisions
had the same effect as money judgments
in the old probate courts and were auto-
matic liens except in populous cities and
counties. In addition, municipal courts
became divisions of the circuit court20
and were, therefore, elevated to the sta-
tus of courts of record, the definition of
which was revised by the Court Reform
and Revision Act of 1978 to include the
supreme court, courts of appeal and cir-
cuit courts.21 There was concern in the
real estate bar that ajudgment rendered
in the municipal division regarding such
a minor matter as a parking fine was
technically a lien on the defendant's real
estate and therefore operated as a cloud
on this title. 22 Coupled with the same
problem arising from money judgments
rendered in the probate divisions and in
the associate divisions in cases not gov-
erned by Chapter 517, there was a
potentially significant number of judg-
ments operating as liens on real estate
and yet not subject to abstracting or
transcripting requirements.
The problem was compounded by the
fact that Supreme Court Administrative
Rule 4, which established a uniform rec-
ord keeping system in the circuit
courts 23 and required the maintenance
of an alphabetical card file index of all
civil judgments, 24 has not been applied
to the divisions of the circuit courts.
Accordingly, it was virtually impossible
for title examiners in rural areas to find
all the judgments that might operate as
automatic liens on real estate. 2
5
The new legislation enacted by the
Missouri General Assembly in 1982 is
designed to correct the deficiencies in
the present system by eliminating the
automatic judgment lien in all cases.
The act repeals existing Sections
511.350 and 511.500 and replaces them
with two new statutes bearing the same
numerical designation. New Section
511.350 contains three subsections, the
first of which states as follows:
"Judgments and decrees rendered by the
supreme court, by any United States district
or circuit court held within this state, by any
district of the court of appeals, by any circuit
court and any probate division of the circuit
court, except judgments and decrees ren-
dered by associate, small claims and munic-
ipal divisions of the circuit courts, shall be
liens on the real estate of the person against
whom they are rendered, situate in the
county for which or in which the court is
held."26
New Section 511.350(2) provides that
judgments rendered in the associate di-
visions are not liens until they "are filed
with the clerk of the circuit court pur-
suant to sections 517.770 and 517.780,
RSMo." There are two possible con-
structions for this provision. The first
construction is that the statute extends
the trans~ripting requirements of Chap-
ter 517 to all money judgments ren-
dered in the associate division regard-
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less of whether such judgments stem
from cases within the scope of that
chapter.2 7 The second possible con-
struction is that the statute continues
the prior practice of allowing judgments
to become liens in cases within the
scope of Chapter 517 but is silent as to
the effect of money judgments rendered
in other cases. The second construction,
read in conjunction with the "except"
clause of new Section 511.350(1), would
lead to the conclusion that judgments in
cases outside the scope of Chapter 517
cannot become liens under any
circumstances. 
2 8
One problem with the second con-
struction is that Section 511.350(3) goes
on to make explicit what is implied by
the "except" clause of Section
511.350(1) with regard to judgments
rendered by small claims and municipal
divisions by providing that they "shall
not constitute liens against the real
estate of the person against whom they
are rendered." There is no similar provi-
sion regarding associate division judg-
ments in cases outside the scope of
Chapter 517, and this gives rise to an
implication that this class of cases was
intended to come within the ambit of
Section 511.350(2). In fact, of course,
the legislature may simply have over-
looked these cases in formulating the
statute. However, since transcripts
under Chapter 517 are not prepared as a
matter of course by the associate divi-
sion clerks but are available only upon
the request of the judgment creditors,
construing the statute in such a way as to
extend the transcripting requirement to
all cases heard in the associate division
would not significantly increase the
clerks' obligations. Further, since such
judgments will not become liens until
the transcript is filed, extending the
transcripting requirement should pre-
sent no problems for title examiners.
Accordingly, the first construction set
out above may be preferable; and if it is
adopted any money judgment rendered
in the associate division, whether in a
case governed by Chapter 517 or other-
wise, will operate as a lien on the judg-
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ment debtor's real estate if the proce-
dures of Sections 517.770 and 517.780
are followed.
Other problems with the
new legislation
There are other problems with the
new legislation. New Section 511.350(1)
specifically provides that judgments of
the circuit courts and probate divisions
are liens, and Section 511.360, which
has not been altered, states in part that
"Such liens shall commence on the day
of the rendition of the judgment ....
Without more, such judgments would
continue to be automatic liens, but new
Section 511.500, which is the heart of
the act, negates this result by providing
in part as follows:
No judgment hereafter rendered by any
court shall be a lien on real estate situate in
such counties or city not within a county,
until an abstract of said judgment shall be
entered in a book to be kept by the clerk of
the circuit court having jurisdiction of civil
causes within a county or a city not within a
county. ...
This latter provision replaces the
prior statute providing for abstracting in
populous cities and counties, and since
the new statute does not contain popula-
tion limitations it apparently applies to
the money judgments of all circuit
courts and probate divisions within the
state. This result is not absolutely clear
because the statute's use of the word"such" to modify "counties or city not
within a county" gives the impression
that its impact is limited to certain coun-
ties, but this impression is probably mis-
leading. The statute in large measure
tracks the language of the prior provi-
sion limiting the abstracting require-
ment to "such cities or counties" as qual-
ified for coverage by population, and the
word "such" in the new statute is no
doubt vestigial. As a result, new Section
511.500 directly contradicts Section
511.360. In this situation, the later of
the two repugnant statutes should be
enforced; and the quoted portion of Sec-
tion 511.360 should be considered im-
plicitly repealed. 9
,Another problem is that Section
511.360 also provides that judgment
liens continue for a period of three years
from the date the judgment is rendered
subject to revival, 3° but this provision
was enacted in conjunction with the
automatic lien provision which has now
been implicitly repealed. Presumably,
the implicit repeal only extends to those
portions of Section 511.360 that are in-
consistent with the new legislation and
the three year limitation continues to be
applicable; but when does the three
years commence? Arguably, it still com-
mences on the day the judgment is ren-
dered; but such an interpretation is at
odds with the overall thrust of the new
scheme and should be rejected. A better
interpretation is that the provision for
the durational period has been amended
by implication to commence on the date
the lien commences, which is now the
date the abstract is entered. From the
point of view of the judgment creditor
who wants the lien extended beyond the
three years, the safe working presump-
tion should be that the critical date is the





the later date. There is another apparent
problem created by contradictory provi-
sions between the old scheme and the
new legislation. Section 511.360,goes on
to state that "when two or more judg-
ments or decrees are rendered at the
same term, as between the parties enti-
tled to such judgments or decrees, the
lien shall commence on the last day of
-the term at which they are -rendered."
New Section 511.500, however, states
that "The liens of all judgments entered
in said book, as herein provided for,
shall have priority according to the
period of time of their respective entries
into said book .... ..
These statements are not irreconcil-
able. The language of new Section
511.500, which tracks the prior statu-
tory provision relating to practice in
populous cities and counties, should be
viewed as providing for the date of entry
as the priority date in contests between
a judgment lienor and such parties as
real estate mortgagees, fixture financers
and the bankruptcy trustee but as silent
on the issue of priorities between judg-
ment lienors. -Under this construction,
Section 511.360 would still control
priorities between creditors with judg-
ments rendered at the same term of
court,31 and under prior case law the
first party to levy execution would attain
priority. 2 Further, since new Section
511.500 retains much of the language of
its predecessor, it is logical to resolve
the issue by reference to cases interpret-
ing priority rights in populous cities and
counties; and the cases hold that in such
areas there was no priority among judg-
ments rendered at the same term. 3
This construction should now apply to
all money judgments rendered in any
circuit court or probate division during
the .same term.
The new legislation does not affect
.Section 511.510, and thus all clerks of
the probate divisions will have an
affirmative duty to furnish an abstract to
the appropriate circuit court clerk with-
in five days of a judgment's rendition;
and all circuit court clerks will have an
affirmative duty to prepare and enter
abstracts ofjudgments rendered in their
own courts within five days. Section
511.510 contains language limiting its
impact to "such city or county" and be-
fore .the recent enactment that language
referred to populous cities and counties.
As with the similar language in new Sec-
tion 511.500, use of the word "such" is
now irrelevant and should be ignored.
-On the whole, the new enactment is
salutary. By eliminating the automatic
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lien and extending the abstracting re-
quirement, it should make it easier for
title examiners to locate liens. It also
takes care of the troubling possibility
that money judgments rendered in
municipal courts could be liens on real
estate. However, by dealing with only




the legislature created unnecessary
ambiguities. Section 511.360 should
have been amended to make it clear that
judgment liens no longer commence on
the day of rendition and that the three
year durational periods no longer com-
mence on that date, and Section 511.500
should have deleted the word "such."
Section 511.510 should have been
amended to conform the duties of the
clerks more closely to the expanded
scope of Section 511.500; and new Sec-
tion 511.350 should have dealt specifi-
cally with the problems created by
money judgments rendered in the
associate divisions in cases outside the
scope of Chapter 517. These problems
are, however, minimal; and they can be
resolved by a careful judicial interpreta-
tion of the new legislative scheme.
More troubling from a practical stand-
point is the extension of the abstracting
requirement to the probate divisions. It
makes little sense to have an abstracting
scheme for probate division cases and a
parallel transcripting scheme for associ-
ate division cases. A better solution
would have been to apply the provisions
of Sections 517.770 and 517.780 to pro-
bate division judgments. By doing so,
the duties of the probate division clerks
would not have been increased but
judgment creditors would not have
been prejudiced since a transcript could
be obtained upon request. There is no
real reason for distinguishing between
associate division and probate division
judgments with respect to their capacity
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to become liens. Further legislation
adopting such a scheme could also clean
up the interpretive problems created by
the recent enactment. E
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